

SEP 0 4 2007

HEARING OFFICER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA BY

### BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

RONALD S MATHENY,
Bar No 013951,
Respondent,

Respondent,

Case No. 06-0215

CONCLUSIONS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION

# PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State Bar filed its complaint February 28, 2007 An Answer was filed March 22, 2007 Hearing was held on June 19, 2007 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law

#### FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1 At all times relevant, Respondent was a lawyer licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona, having first been admitted on October 26, 1991
- 2 On or about November 5, 2002, Charles C Keever executed a Last Will and Testament ("Will"), which Mr Keever again signed before a Notary Public on or about December 27, 2002
  - 3 No witnesses had signed the Will when executed, or when notarized
- 4 The Will listed Keever's friend, Eva Stalbrand, as Personal Representative and as the only beneficiary.
  - 5 On or about April 14, 2005, Keever died
- 6 On or about June 1, 2005, Stalbrand met with Respondent regarding probate of Keever's Will

- 7 Stalbrand informed Respondent that she and Keever had been living together for five years and were engaged to be married. She advised Respondent that Keever had half-relatives; Respondent advised that they were not important
  - 8 Respondent did not recognize that witnesses had not signed the Will
- 9 Respondent's practice was limited to trusts and estate planning and he had very little experience handling probates. He had handled but a few informal probate matters and never handled a formal probate. Unless simple, he would refer probate matters out of his office.
  - 10 Respondent believed that the Will was valid and submitted it for informal probate
  - 11 Respondent charged a flat fee of \$2,000 to handle the informal probate
  - 12 Respondent did not provide a written fee agreement
  - 13 Stalbrand paid \$2,000 for the informal probate
- 14 Respondent attempted to file an Application for Informal Probate of the Will on or about June 2, 2005, but the Application was rejected by the Clerk's office because the Will lacked signatures. The paperwork was submitted as a *pro per* litigant and did not reflect Respondent's appearance. Respondent did not understand the significance of failing to notice his appearance as counsel of record in the informal probate proceedings.
- 15 Respondent was advised by the Clerk's Office that the Will would need to be formally probated
- 16 If probated formally, Respondent would have referred Stalbrand to another attorney
- 17 Respondent met with Stalbrand shortly after the Application for Informal Probate was rejected and advised her that the application had been rejected for lack of witnesses
- 18 Although the testimony was in dispute with respect to the critical events surrounding this meeting, there is no question that Stalbrand, in Respondent's presence and with his knowledge and assistance, added two witness names, addresses and signatures to the Will Stalbrand claims that Respondent told her to add the information, and Respondent

claims that Stalbrand did so on her own volition, although he took "full responsibility for having thoughts and intentions and leading and saying" that Stalbrand's objectives would be met if there were witnesses, and for prompting Stalbrand to add witnesses <sup>1</sup>

- 19 When Stalbrand was adding the witness names to the Will, Respondent told her to make the signatures look different
  - 20 Respondent knew that the added "witnesses" did not witness Keever's signature
- 21 On or about June 15, 2005, Respondent submitted the altered Will with the Maricopa County Superior Court, along with other pleadings necessary to commence the informal probate of the Will in *In the Matter of the Estate of Charles Christian Keever*, PB20005-001845 Respondent did so knowing that the instrument was altered
- 22 In the Application for the informal probate, Respondent averred that Keever had no spouse, children or heirs Respondent was aware that Keever had half relatives
- 23 Respondent believed, at the time, that the Will was valid and could have been formally probated However, he lacked a legal understanding of the validity of the will at the time
- 24 On June 15, 2005, Stalbrand was appointed the Personal Representative of Keever's estate
- 25 Michale Watts, Keever's cousin, and Ole Charles Keever, Keever's half brother, retained attorney James Polese to investigate the bona fides of the Will Polese sent a letter, dated June 27, 2005, to Stalbrand requesting a written statement regarding the events surrounding the execution of the Will, interviews with the two "witnesses," and an explanation for the claim that Keever had no spouse, children, or heirs

Given my conclusions and recommendation, I need not resolve the factual question of who initiated the scheme to add the witnesses. Both Respondent and Ms. Stalbrand had motive to fabricate on this issue. Respondent because his license is at risk, Ms. Stalbrand because she was suing Respondent in the Superior Court. Under either scenario, the evidence reveals that Respondent conspired to commit a felony.

- 26 Polese filed a Demand for Notice in the probate matter, PB2005-001845, on or about June 27, 2005
- 27 Stalbrand presented the letter from Polese to Respondent on or about June 29,2005
- 28 By letter dated July 7, 2005, Respondent informed Polese that he represented Stalbrand, but would be on vacation and would respond to the letter upon his return at the end of the month
- 29 On or about August 11, 2005, Respondent created notes to his file which reflected his knowledge that the decedent had a cousin and which memorialized, in part, the story created about the "witnesses," which Respondent knew was not true. These notes were not submitted or used in subsequent proceedings but were part of the file turned over to successor counsel.
- 30 On or about August 22, 2005, Respondent sent a letter to Polese advising that the execution of the Will was "awkward" because it had been signed by Keever on two different dates, the second time in front of a notary Respondent stated that he was unaware of anything that would invalidate the Will
- Respondent was concerned that the false "witnesses" scheme would be uncovered
- 32 On or about September 14, 2005, Polese, by letter, asked Respondent for contact information for the two "witnesses," and asked to interview Stalbrand
- 33 On or about September 19, 2005, Respondent, by letter, agreed to Stalbrand's interview and stated that his client had no current contact information for the "witnesses" other than as stated in the Will
- 34 On or about December 2, 2005, Polese, by letter, advised Respondent that he wanted to interview Stalbrand under oath prior to the holidays
- 35 Respondent and Polese had telephone conversations on January 25 and 26, 2006

  During these conversations, Respondent admitted that the two witnesses had not actually

witnessed Keever's execution of the Will and that Stalbrand had entered the witnesses names onto the Will in front of him Prior to these telephone conferences, Respondent believed the Will to be valid. After speaking with Polese, Respondent believed that the Will was not valid.

- 36 On our about January 26, 2006, Polese sent a letter to Respondent advising him that his client must file a motion advising that the document is not a valid Will, that the power of attorney must be revoked and that the estate should be administered as though the decedent died intestate
- 37 Respondent concluded that Polese was correct, prepared the necessary documents and consulted with Stalbrand about the need to file the documents
- 38 Although there was conflicting testimony about when Respondent advised Ms Stalbrand to retain different counsel, Respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Stipulation to Set Aside with the Court after the conflict between Respondent and Stalbrand arose Respondent felt pressure to accomplish the set aside as soon as possible Stalbrand was thereafter removed as personal representative
- 39 On or about February 10, 2006, Respondent self-reported his conduct to the State Bar His self-report admitted to ethical violations but, in some ways, minimized his conduct The self-report also contained false information specifically, that he "suspected" that the "witnesses" had not witnessed Keever sign the will when in fact he knew so Additionally, Respondent falsely stated that Stalbrand had advised him that Keever had no family In fact, Stalbrand told Respondent that Keever had half-siblings and cousins Respondent self reported to the bar only because the ethical impropriety had come to light
- 40 Respondent advised and assisted Ms Stalbrand with the distribution of assets while she was the estate's personal representative. After Ms Stalbrand was removed as personal representative, she re-paid \$85,000 to the estate due to her distribution of estate assets during the time she believed herself to be the sole beneficiary

2.1

41 Respondent paid \$15,000 to Keever's estate as settlement for any claims the estate had against him, and refunded his \$2,000 fee to Stalbrand

42 Stalbrand sued Respondent alleging legal malpractice for withdrawing the Will from informal probate and allowing the estate to be administered as an intestate estate Stalbrand alleges in the lawsuit that the Will was valid. At the time of the hearing, Respondent had offered to settle the lawsuit for \$100,000.

### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1 By clear and convincing evidence, I find that Respondent violated ER 1 1 (failure to provide competent representation), ER 1 2(d) (assisting client in dishonest conduct), ER 1 5 (b) (lack of written fee agreement), ER 1 7 (continued representation despite conflict of interest), ER 3 3 (candor to the tribunal), ER 8 4 (c) (knowingly engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation), ER 8 4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)

2 The State Bar has failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a violation of ER 1 4 (communication)

## RECOMMENDATION

The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter future misconduct *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz 182, 187, 859 P 2d 1315, 1320 (1993) It is also the objective of lawyer discipline to protect the profession and the administration of justice *In re Neville*, 147 Ariz 106, 708 P 2d 1297 (1985) Yet another purpose is to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity. *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz 20,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Respondent objected to the consideration of this allegation because it was not specifically pled in ¶ 58 of the complaint (listing Ethical Rules by number). However, it was clearly pled in ¶57 of the complaint (listing the alleged violations in narrative form). Respondent had sufficient notice of this allegation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>I do not find that the ER 8 4 (c) violation was negligent. Whether or not Respondent believed no harm would come from dishonest conduct misses the point. Respondent knowingly presented an altered instrument to the tribunal.

29, 881 P 2d 352, 361 (1994)

In imposing discipline, it is appropriate to consider the facts of the case, the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and the proportionality of discipline imposed in analogous cases *Matter of Bowen*, 178 Ariz 283, 286, 872 P 2d 1235, 1238 (1994)

### ABA STANDARDS

## 1 Ethical duty violated

Respondent violated his duties to a client, to the legal system, and to the public

The duty to the client is the most important duty a lawyer has Respondent failed to avoid a conflict of interest and was incompetent in his representation. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury to a client. ABA Std § 4.42. A reprimand (censure) is generally appropriate when a lawyer demonstrates a failure to understand relevant legal doctrines or procedures and causes injury to a client. ABA Std § 4.43.

With respect to a violation of the duty to the legal system, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer submits a false document to the court with the intent to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceedings. ABA Std § 6.11 Suspension, however, is appropriate when the lawyer knows that false documents are being submitted to the Court, takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. ABA Std § 6.12

Violations owed to the public involve a failure to maintain personal integrity Disbarment is appropriate when the lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct which includes an intentional interference with the administration of justice, misrepresentation, fraud, or a conspiracy to so commit ABA Std §5 11 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in criminal conduct other than as described in ABA Std §5 11, which

is a serious reflection on the lawyers fitness to practice ABA Std § 5 12 Reprimand is generally appropriate if the lawyer engages in other conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation that adversely affects an attorney's fitness to practice law ABA Std § 5 13

The sanction imposed should be consistent with the most serious misconduct Standards, p 6 ERs 3.3 and 8 4(c) are the most serious based on these facts Respondent intentionally submitted an altered instrument with the Court intending the Court to rely on it

# 2 The lawyer's mental state

Respondent's actions were knowing. He knowingly filed a document he knew to be false with the Court intending the Court to rely on it as a bona fide document to allow the informal probate of the Will even though the Will was not entitled to informal probate. Respondent believed at the time that the Will was otherwise valid and I do not find an intentional attempt to cause the administration of an invalid Will. Rather, Respondent sought a short cut

### 3 Extent of injury

Here, there was actual financial injury to Stalbrand and to Keever's family Stalbrand incurred additional attorney's fees and was required to re-pay the estate for removed assets. Assuming that the Will was valid as alleged in her lawsuit against Respondent, Stalbrand lost the benefits she would have been entitled to under the Will Keever's family had to retain counsel to investigate the execution of the Will There was also an injury to the legal process in that a fraud was committed on the Court

#### 4 Aggravating and Mitigation Factors

The following aggravating factors are present

9 22(a) Prior disciplinary offenses Both involve unrelated conduct and are approximately eight years old so they are not given much weight

9 22(c) Pattern of misconduct Respondent committed multiple ethical violations in the course of this representation including complicity in the alteration of an instrument, filing the altered instrument, seeking to avoid discovery, and falsely reporting his conduct

9 22(f) Submission of false statements during the disciplinary process. This is part of the pattern of misconduct and, therefore, is given no actual weight as it has been considered in connection with 9 22 (c)

9 22(1) Substantial experience in the practice of law

9 22(k) Illegal conduct

The following mitigation factors are present

9 32(b) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. The catalyst for the ethical improprieties was Respondent's misguided effort to accomplish, by artifice, what he believed could be validly accomplished otherwise. The rest of the ethical violations flowed from this misguided effort.

9 32 (d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences Whether or not the efforts were timely is questionable and, therefore, I have not given much weight to this factor

9 32 (e) Cooperative attitude toward disciplinary proceedings. Respondent self-reported, admitted most of the violations in his Answer and sought to stipulate to uncontested facts during the hearing process, albeit late in the process. I have not given much weight to this factor, however, because of the false statements in the initial self-report to the bar

9 32 (g) Character Respondent's character witnesses were credible and spoke well of Respondent's personal character

9 32 (k) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions <sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>This is somewhat speculative Respondent offered restitution to Ms Stalbrand and the matter is pending in Maricopa County Superior Court. It appears that the matter will be resolved with Respondent making restitution to Ms. Stalbrand funded by the sale of real property owned by Respondent.

## PROPORTIONALITY

To achieve proportionality when imposing discipline, sanctions must be tailored to the individual facts of the case in order to achieve the purposes of discipline *In re Wines*, 135 Ariz 203, 660 P 2d 454 (1983) and *In re Wolfram*, 174 Ariz 49, 847 P 2d 94 (1993) Each case is different *E g In Re Peasley*, 208 Ariz 27, at ¶ 61, 90 P 3d 764 (2004)

A review of some of the more pertinent cases is presented below. I am unable to glean an overarching principle that strongly guides my decision in this case as the cases all seem to turn on the individual facts and circumstances of the violations, and the offender

Last year, the Commission considered *In re Cheryl Case*, No 04-2103 There, the Respondent has prepared and filed a petition and affidavit containing material omissions of fact and misrepresentations. Although she had relied on the representations of her client in the preparation of the pleadings, she failed to remediate the damage once she learned the truth. Respondent received a ninety-day suspension followed by probation

Matter of Charles, 174 Ariz 91, 847 P 2d 592 (1993), concerned a lawyer who forged his client's name to a power of attorney when his client, a friend, was too ill to sign, but which was not used for any purpose other than to gain access to the client in the hospital Respondent had a valid signed power of attorney in his possession and did not want to release the original

After the client died, Respondent used a different forged power of attorney to transfer client's assets to a joint account without advising the transferor that the power of attorney was revoked upon the client's death. The transfers however were not for Respondent's benefit and he did not personally gain from the transfers. These actions resulted in a finding of a violation of ER 8 4(c)

The Court determined that Respondent's conduct was both dishonest and a misrepresentation but, finding no criminal intent, declined to suspend the respondent

Matter of Harrington, No 99-2020, involved an attorney who submitted a false affidavit in discovery. He subsequently was convicted of presenting a false instrument for

filing in violation of ARS § 39-161 Relying on ABA Std § 511(b), and after acknowledging that disbarment was the presumptive sanction, the Commission found censure to be appropriate based on a proportionality analysis and significant mitigation presented <sup>5</sup>

Matter of Garrison, No 94-1053, considered an attorney complicit in the forged signature of a settlement check for the purposes of effecting the client's intent. When the matter went awry, Respondent self-reported prior to a complaint being filed. He was censured after the Commission determined a number of mitigating factors and no aggravating factors.

Matter of Gieszl, No 03-1278, involved an attorney who fabricated documents as part of an ongoing effort to convince her client that a personal injury settlement had been reached when, in fact, no complaint had been filed and the statute of limitations had run Respondent had significant emotional and mental health problems during the relevant time frame and did not file a false instrument with the Court She received a one year suspension

The Respondent, in *In re Moak*, 205 Ariz 351, 71 P 3d 343 (2003), failed to disclose, during discovery, in motion practice, and in trial, pertinent information relating to his client's injuries causing the defendants, the judge and the jury to be misled about the cause of injuries. The Court determined that Moak acted knowingly. Once he accepted responsibility for his actions, Moak took steps to rectify the effects of his conduct on his clients. After weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances against the presumptive sanction of suspension, in particular additional charges against the Respondent revealing a pattern of misconduct, the Court suspended Moak for six months and a day

No pattern can be gleaned from these cases for this type of conduct The cases present a confusing patchwork of *sui generis* cases which do not make it possible to assess conduct except by considering the unique facts presented in each case. Accordingly, while guided

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Aggravation included dishonest or selfish motive, vulnerability of victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law, Mitigation included absence of prior disciplinary record, cooperative attitude to disciplinary process, character or reputation, imposition of other sanctions, and remorse

by these cases, none of the results are dispositive 6

#### DISCUSSION OF APPROPRIATE SANCTION

The purposes of lawyer discipline include the need to deter the Respondent and other attorneys from engaging in similar unethical conduct. *In re Kleindienst*, 132 Ariz 95, 644 P 2d 249 (1982), to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity, *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 362 (1994), and to maintain the integrity of the legal system *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz 182, 859 P 2d 1315 (1993)

In the instant case, based upon the Respondent's testimony, demeanor and actions, it appears that there is no need to deter him personally - he has been profoundly affected by these proceedings and the consequences of his actions. However, a meaningful sanction is required to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity and to maintain the integrity of the legal system.

Respondent knowingly submitted an altered instrument with the Court with the intent to deceive the Court Respondent contends that the filing of the false document was intended to effectuate what he believed were the decedent's wishes <sup>7</sup> As noted in *Charles*, however, that belief does not justify the failure to maintain personal or systemic integrity

But for the independent investigation of the decedent's heirs, the Respondent would not have ameliorated his transgressions. Moreover, when confronted with discovery, the Respondent failed to withdraw from the situation which created a greater harm to his client

Based upon the unique facts of this case, I believe that the Respondent's requested sanctions of censure and probation do not sufficiently account for the seriousness of the ethical violation. On the other hand, the State Bar's request for a one year suspension seems

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>A review of the cases illustrates why the parties were unable to reach an agreement in this matter. Respondent and the State Bar could each credibly rely on the cases which supported their respective positions on the appropriate sanction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Specifically, Respondent testified that, in connection with the need to formally probate that the will, that "in my mind – the ends were going to meet at the same result."

1 unduly harsh under these circumstances 2 Accordingly, it is recommended that the Respondent be suspended for 90 days and, upon reinstatement, be placed on probation with appropriate conditions including, but not 3 limited to, 15 hours of continuing legal education in probate law for each year that he is on 4 5 probation 6 DATED this  $\frac{31^{57}}{}$  day of August, 2007 7 8 Martin Lickerman /C3 9 10 Hearing Officer 7W 11 12 Copies of the foregoing mailed this 4th day of August, 2007, to September 13 Nancy Greenlee 821 East Fern Drive North 14 Phoenix, Arizona 85014 15 Patricia Ramirez State Bar of Arizona 16 4201 North 24th Street, Suite 200 17 Phoenix, Arizona 85016 18 By Christina Da 19 20 21 22 23 24

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